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We study a two-period exchange economy with complete financial markets and endoge-
nous borrowing constraints. Contrary to perfect foresight paradigm, we assume that agents 
are heterogeneous in their ability to forecast future prices. We introduce a new equilibrium 
concept, called informationally constrained equilibrium, where the formation of price expec-
tations is endogenous and reflects the revelation of information from observing bounds on 
liabilities designed to ensure solvency at any contingency. We prove that, under standard 
assumptions, an equilibrium always exists and we characterize the degree of information 
revealed by the endogenous debt limits.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
A remarkable feature of the Arrow and Debreu (1954) model is that it imposes weak informational requirements. Agents 
are assumed to know only their own characteristics, no assumption is imposed on what they know or believe about others’ 
fundamentals and beliefs. Market prices convey all relevant information and guide agents to take their decisions.
While the informational requirements of the model are minimal, its formal extension to uncertain dynamic environments 
is burdened with a formidable presence of necessary markets for the delivery of goods at all conceivable states. Arrow 
(1953) and Radner (1972) showed how the allocation of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium can be implemented with a more 
realistic (sequential) structure of commodity and financial markets that permits the delivery of contingent money at future 
events. However, the transition to a sequential setting is not without cost. It implies that agents make decisions based on 
expectations of future prices for commodities and contracts, and these decisions and expectations are taken to be collectively 
compatible. Although agents need not agree on the joint probability distribution of future events, they base their decisions 
anticipating that a unique price vector will prevail at every contingency. That is, agents have degenerate and common 
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expectations, together with market clearing, defines a perfect foresight equilibrium (Radner (1972)).
Perfect foresight rules out situations where economic variables create informational externalities. Before taking their 
decisions, agents usually observe private signals that are correlated with states. One expects that the less informed agents 
will try to infer information from observing variables influenced by the behaviour of all (in particular, the more informed) 
agents. Radner (1979) (see also Allen (1981a), Grossman (1981)) proposed an equilibrium concept, rational expectations, that 
takes into account the potential informational feedback from market clearing prices. Equilibrium prices are fully revealing: 
when agents use all available information (private signals and the information revealed by prices) to calculate their demands, 
market clearing leads precisely to those prices.
Both equilibrium concepts impose strong requirements on the formation of price expectations. Rationality no longer 
implies that individual behaviour is determined by the maximization of a well ordered utility function, but also that agents 
know the map from states (perfect foresight) or signals (rational expectations) to equilibrium prices. In either case, this 
map summarises a huge amount of information. As stressed by Radner (1982) (see also Dutta and Morris (1997)), these 
knowledge requirements are hard to justify. Decision makers have to fully understand the economic environment and have 
an implausible capacity for computation and communication.
One way to defend these concepts is to assume that agents draw on past experience to predict the evolution of future 
prices. Although this may be true in a stable world where similar events occur regularly, it is difficult to accept it in environ-
ments where agents are exposed to new and unfamiliar events. In addition, learning does not always provide a satisfactory 
foundation for either hypothesis. Rational learning requires that agents’ prior beliefs assign positive probability on the true 
model for the entire stochastic process, not just for what would happen after beliefs converged (see Kalai and Lehrer (1993)
and Blume and Easley (1998)). When agents base their decisions to statistical models that are misspecified, adaptive learn-
ing converges to self-confirming equilibria, not to rational expectations equilibria, and the differences between these two 
concepts might be substantial (see Sargent (2008)). There is also a vast literature (see Wagener (2014) and the references 
therein) exploring whether perfect foresight and rational expectations provide a good description in a number of expectation 
formation experiments. The findings suggest that agents’ expectations coordinate quickly but not necessarily on the rational 
expectations value. Moreover, even in situations where the hypotheses perform well, it is more likely that coordination on 
rational values is brought about by the institutional structure of the market rather than the rationality of agents.
The paper is an attempt to show that institutional restrictions can, to some extent, weaken the coordination requirements 
underpinning the perfect foresight or rational expectations equilibrium concept. It explores how price expectations are 
formed in a sequential (two-period) model with endogenous borrowing constraints. Contrary to perfect foresight paradigm, 
we assume that agents are heterogeneous in their ability to forecast future prices. Specifically, we study an economy with 
two types of agents. Agents of the first type can perfectly anticipate future prices as in Radner (1972). We refer to those 
agents as sophisticated. Agents of the second type cannot perfectly foresee future prices. We refer to those agents as mini-
mally rational.
Minimally rational agents infer information from observing variables that are influenced by the behaviour of all market 
participants. This might look similar to rational expectations (Radner (1979)), but differentiates from it in a crucial aspect. 
The transmission of information in our setting is not linked to the observation of prices, but rather relates to endogenous 
bounds on short-sales. Such a mechanism has the advantage of being simpler and costless (in terms of what agents have to 
know) as opposed to the map that associates equilibrium prices to signals. In the spirit of Norman (2015), the coordination 
of price expectations reflects the agents’ hypothesis regarding the restrictions they face in financial markets. This is in line 
with experimental evidence (Wagener (2014)) suggesting that agents are rational in an operational sense, trying to tie their 
prediction problem to the information revealed by the institutional arrangements that legislate and manage their activities.
Lack of perfect foresight implies that minimally rational agents might be insolvent at some contingencies and have to 
default on their liabilities. The temporary equilibrium literature (Grandmont (1977)) recognized this issue long ago and 
argued for the design of explicit default and bankruptcy rules. For instance, in Green (1974), bankrupt agents are allocated 
the minimum level of consumption. As pointed out by Eichberger (1989), such rules raise additional complications since 
they lead to budget sets, and consequently to demand correspondences, that are non-convex.
To overcome this issue, we follow the literature on limited commitment (Kehoe and Levine (1993), Zhang (1997) and 
Alvarez and Jermann (2000)) and impose bounds on short sales designed to preclude default at equilibrium. Rationality 
in this setting means that all agents know that the bounds ensure solvency according to future prevailing prices. That is, 
observing the bounds, minimally rational agents are capable of inferring a set of prices that induce non-negative wealth 
at all contingencies. They basically know the map from prices to bounds compatible with no bankruptcy. If an equilibrium 
exists, then equilibrium prices will be contained in this set. However, the signal (bounds on short sales) does not allow 
to discern the equilibrium prices among the other prices in the set. Therefore, expectations may not be common and 
degenerate. Nevertheless, they are formed endogenously and, as in rational expectations, reflect all available information.
We propose an equilibrium concept, informationally constrained equilibrium, that makes precise the way price expectations 
become compatible with the observation of endogenous debt limits. We show that, under standard assumptions, such an 
equilibrium always exists and we characterize the degree of the revealed information. In that respect, the analysis relates to 
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information economies.2
A conceptual issue of our equilibrium notion is that there is no unambiguous mechanism that minimally rational agents 
can employ to assign a probability distribution on the set of possible prevailing prices. Therefore, the choice of a criterion to 
rank first period actions is not obvious. Inspired by recent advances in decision theory, we assume that minimally rational 
agents make decisions based on an adapted variational preferences or smooth preferences criterion.3 In that respect, the paper 
relates to a growing literature that incorporates ambiguity aversion in the standard Arrow-Debreu model (see, for instance, 
Rigotti et al. (2008) and Rigotti and Shannon (2012)) and in asymmetric information economies (see, for instance, Tallon 
(1998), He and Yannelis (2015), Liu (2016), de Castro et al. (2017)). The crucial difference is that, in our setting, there is 
ambiguity about endogenous uncertainty (future prevailing prices) as opposed to ambiguity about exogenous uncertainty 
(prevailing state of nature).
Existence is proven in a constructive way. We first consider an auxiliary economy and show that it attains an equilibrium 
in the spirit of Radner (1972). We then argue that any such equilibrium is indeed an informationally constrained equilib-
rium. The main technical hurdle amounts to show that the demand correspondence of minimally rational agents is upper 
semi-continuous.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an example where a sequential equilibrium fails to exist for ar-
bitrary price expectations, and provides insight on the way the same economy can support an informationally constrained 
equilibrium. Section 3 lays out a general model with endogenous borrowing limits. Section 4 discusses how agents, espe-
cially the minimally rational, construct their objectives. Section 5 defines the equilibrium concept and proves its existence. 
Section 6 characterizes the revelation of information at equilibrium. Section 7 highlights how the model can be extended to 
more than two periods. Main proofs and technical results, some of which can be of independent interest, are presented in 
the two appendices.
2. Non-existence of sequential equilibrium with arbitrary price expectations
To motivate the analysis we present below an example (see also Daher et al. (2007)) in which a sequential competitive 
equilibrium fails to exist even if there is some agreement among agents about the future prevailing prices. Equilibrium 
is achieved temporarily, since only the actions of the first period are coordinated by spot prices. Any price vector that 
potentially can clear commodity markets in the second period is not compatible with the given profile of agents’ price 
expectations. That is, for all possible market clearing prices, one agent goes bankrupt and a sequential equilibrium cannot 
be supported.
Example. We consider a two-period exchange economy with no uncertainty. There is a single commodity, L0 = {0}, the 
first period t = 0 and three commodities, L1 = {1, 2, 3}, the second period t = 1. At period t = 0, two agents, J = { j1, j2}, 
trade a single asset that delivers one unit of good 1 the next period, i.e., the asset’s dividend is ξ = (1, 0, 0). Both agents 
have strictly positive endowments, identical first period utilities, but distinct second period utilities. Specifically, for any 
j ∈ J ,
∀x0 ∈R+, u j0(x0) = x0 and e j0 > 0,
∀x1 ∈R3+, u j11 (x1) = 2x1(1) + x1(2) + x1(3), u j21 (x1) = x1(1) + 2[x1(2) + x1(3)]
and
∀ ∈ L1, e j1() = e j1 > 0.
We choose the standard normalization for second period prices, i.e.,
1 :=
⎧⎨⎩p1 ∈R3+ : ∑
∈L1
p1() = 1
⎫⎬⎭ .
Agents have different price expectations defined by the probability4
ν j = P H 1{p jH } + P L1{p jL},
2 When assets are real, there is space for partial revelation of information (see, among others, Allen (1981b, 1985), Jordan (1982), Ausubel (1990) and 
Pietra and Siconolfi (2008)). With nominal assets, equilibrium prices may be non-revealing (see, among others, Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1993), Rahi 
(1995) and Citanna and Villanacci (2000)).
3 See Maccheroni et al. (2006) and Klibanoff et al. (2005) for an axiomatisation of these criteria.
4 If K is a finite set and A is a subset of K , then 1A denotes the vector (1A(k))k∈K in RK defined by 1A(k) = 1 if k ∈ A and 1A(k) = 0 elsewhere.
C. Le Van et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 115 (2019) 436–458 4394where P H > 0, P L > 0 and P H + P L = 1. That is, agents expect that only two price vectors may prevail at the second period, 
i.e., suppν j = {p jH , p jL}.
Both agents believe that goods 2 and 3 will be priced equally, i.e., p
j
H (2) = p jH (3) and p jL(2) = p jL(3). However, 
agent j1 believes that the price of good 1 will be lower than the price of the other two goods. Though agent j2 assigns a 
positive probability to this event, she believes that the opposite may also be true.
Formally, let ρ jH = p jH (2)/p jH (1) and ρ jL = p jL(2)/p jL(1) be the price of good 2 in units of good 1, and assume that
0 < ρ j2L < 1 and 2 < ρ
j1
L < ρ
j2
H ≤ ρ j1H . (i)
We also impose the following restrictions on fundamentals
2 <
e j20
(1 + 2ρ j1L )e j11
< 2
P L
ρ
j2
L
+ P H . (ii)
Let θ j denote the asset position of agent j ∈ J . For any p1 ∈ 1, the indirect utility function is given by
v j(p1, θ
j) = max
{
u j1(x1) : p1 · x1 ≤ e j1 + p1(1)θ j
}
,
while the period-1 demand for consumption is given by
d j1(p1, θ
j) := argmax
{
u j1(x1) : p1 · x1 ≤ e j1 + p1(1)θ j
}
.
Since ρ j1H > ρ
j1
L > 1, we have
5
v j1(p j1L , θ
j1) = 2
(
θ j1 + e
j1
1
p j1L (1)
)
and v j1(p j1H , θ
j1) = 2
(
θ j1 + e
j1
1
p j1H (1)
)
.
Since ρ j2L < 1 < ρ
j2
H , we have
6
v j2(p j2L , θ
j2) = 2
(
1
ρ
j2
L
θ j2 + e
j2
1
p j2L (2)
)
and v j2(p j2H , θ
j2) = θ j2 + e
j2
1
p j2H (1)
.
Given a pair (1, q) (with q > 0) of first period prices, the budget set B j0(q, ν
j) of agent j ∈ J contains all pairs (x0, θ)
(with x0 ≥ 0 and θ ∈R) such that7
x0 + q · θ ≤ e j0 and θ ≥ −
e j1
p jL(1)
= −(1 + 2ρ jL )e j1.
The period-0 demand is given by
d j0(q, ν
j) := argmax{x0 + q jθ : (x0, θ) ∈ B j0(q, ν j)}
where
q j1 = 2 and q j2 = 2 P L
ρ
j2
L
+ P H .
Because of restriction (ii), we have q j2 > q j1 .
The demand for the single asset is given by
θ j(q) = {θ ∈ R : ∃x0 ∈R+, (x0, θ) ∈ d j0(q, ν j)}
= argmax
{
(q j − q)θ : qθ ≤ e j0 and θ ≥ −
e j1
p jL(1)
}
.
Only prices that lie in the open interval (q j1 , q j2 ) can clear the asset market, since otherwise both agents will go short 
or long on the asset simultaneously. For any q ∈ (q j1 , q j2), the asset positions are as follows
5 Indeed, the optimal choice of agent j1 is to set x j11 (2) = x j11 (3) = 0.
6 If p j2L prevails, the optimal choice of agent j2 is to set x
j2
1 (1) = 0. If p j2H prevails, the optimal choice is to set x j21 (2) = x j21 (3) = 0.
7 Observe that the second inequality implies that θ ≥ − e
j
1
j = −(1 + 2ρ jH )e j1.pH (1)
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j1
1
p j1L (1)
and θ j2(q) = e
j2
0
q
.
It follows that
q = p
j1
L (1)e
j2
0
e j11
= e
j2
0
(1 + 2ρ j1L )e j11
is the market clearing price.8
Any equilibrium price vector p1 must satisfy 1/5 ≤ p1(1). Given p1 ∈ 1, agent j1’s second period wealth is
w j1(p1) = e j11 + p1(1)θ j1(q).
In particular, at any possible market clearing price p1, the wealth is negative. Indeed,
w j1(p1) =
(
1 − p

1(1)
p j1L (1)
)
e j11 ≤
[
1 − 1
5
(1 + 2ρ j1L )
]
e j11 < 0.
Therefore, agent j1’s demand for consumption is not defined and no sequential equilibrium can exist for this specification 
of price expectations.
In this example, one agent undertakes an extreme position in the asset market. This position is accommodated by the 
other agent and markets clear the first period. The problem arises in the second period, since any potential equilibrium 
price vector does not belong in the support of agent j1’s expectations. If such a price realises, then the agent goes bankrupt 
and no sequential equilibrium can be supported.
There is a trivial way to make arbitrary price expectations compatible with the existence of a sequential equilibrium. 
This amounts to impose real solvency on investment strategies.9 We take a different route and explore whether there are 
minimal restrictions on asset trades that preclude bankruptcy, but allow agents to form endogenous, though not necessarily 
common and degenerate, price expectations.
To provide intuition, we consider the previous example but without specifying arbitrarily agents’ price expectations. 
Assume that asset positions are subject to debt limits given by
∀ j ∈ J , 	 j = {θ ∈R : θ ≥ b j} where b j = −5e j1.
Suppose also that all agents understand that the bound is imposed to ensure solvency at a prevailing, yet unknown, price 
vector p1. Then, every agent can infer the following set of possible period-1 prices
10

 j(b j) =
{
π1 ∈ ◦1 : b j = −
π1 · e j1
π1(1)
}
.
Equivalently, observing the bound b j , every agent understands that the equilibrium price vector should lie on the set

 j(b j) = {π1 ∈ ◦1 : π1(1) = 1/5 and π1(2) + π1(3) = 4/5} .
Notice that the price vector (1/5, 2/5, 2/5) belongs to this set.
To rank actions the first period both agents need to define their indirect utility. Since there is no unambiguous mecha-
nism to assign a probability distribution on the set 
 j(b j), agents have to appeal to a decision criterion that is subject to 
no probabilistic information.
A possible choice is to assume that both agents are pessimist, expecting the worst outcome with the highest probability. 
That is, given θ j ∈ 	 j and π1 in 
 j(b j), agent j computes
v j(π1, θ
j) = max
{
u j(x1) : π1 · x1 ≤ e j1(1) + π1(1)θ j
}
,
and then she takes the infimum value among all prices in 
 j(b j).
8 Condition (ii) implies that q ∈ (q j1 , q j2 ).
9 In the example this is equivalent to restricting asset positions as follows
∀ j ∈ J , 	 j ⊆ {θ ∈R : e j1 + θ ≥ 0}.
If agents are prudent (Svensson (1981)), in the sense that ν j has full support, then investment strategies satisfy real solvency.
10 ◦1 := 1 ∩RL1++ is the relative interior of the convex set 1.
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be supported. Indeed, for q = 1, the optimal asset positions are θ j1 (q) = −5e j11 and θ j2 (q) = 5e j11 . Period-0 consumption 
is e j10 + 5e j11 for agent j1 and e j20 − 5e j11 > 0 for agent j2.11 At period t = 1, agent j1 consumes nothing while agent j2
consumes the total endowment of all goods. These choices are optimal under the price vector p1.
In what follows we extend the analysis to a general two-period model with complete markets and propose an equilibrium 
concept that makes precise the way non-degenerate price expectations relate to the observation of endogenous debt limits.
3. The economy
We consider a pure exchange economy that extends over two periods t ∈ {0, 1}. There is exogenous uncertainty about 
the economic environment (i.e., the consumers’ characteristics) at date t = 1, captured by a finite set S of states of nature. 
The economy consists of a finite set H of agents, indexed by h ∈ H . There are two types of agents who differ on the 
way they form expectations about endogenous variables. More precisely, a subset I of agents is assumed to have perfect 
knowledge of the economy’s fundamentals. These agents, called sophisticated, can perfectly forecast future equilibrium prices. 
The remaining set J = H \ I consists of agents who cannot observe all aspects of the environment. These agents, called 
minimally rational, may not anticipate correctly future equilibrium prices. We allow for economies that are solely populated 
by minimally rational agents, i.e., the set I may be empty.
3.1. Fundamentals and commodity markets
Commodity markets open sequentially. At every period t ∈ {0, 1}, there is a finite set Lt of commodities available for 
trade. Let Xt :=RLt+ denote the set of commodity bundles, and Pt :=RLt+ be the set of commodity prices at period t .
Every agent h ∈ H has a utility function uh0 : X0 →R for first period consumption and an endowment of goods eh0 ∈ X0. 
For any possible realization of exogenous uncertainty s ∈ S , every agent has a utility function uhs : X1 →R for consumption 
and is endowed with a bundle of goods ehs ∈ X1. Expectations about the states of nature are captured by a probability 
measure μh .
Assumptions. For each agent h ∈ H ,
(a) endowments are strictly positive, i.e., eh0 ∈RL0++ and ehs ∈RL1++ for every s ∈ S;
(b) the functions x → uh0(x) and x → uhs (x) are continuously differentiable, concave, strictly increasing, unbounded from 
above but bounded from below;
(c) The probability μh has full support, i.e., suppμh = S .
3.2. Financial markets
Agents trade at the initial period a finite set S of elementary Arrow securities. The index of an Arrow security is identical 
to the state s ∈ S it pays off. Securities are assumed to be numéraire, that is, there exists a non-zero bundle of goods ξ ∈RL1+
such that each security s ∈ S delivers (the market value of) the bundle ξ in state s and nothing in other states.
We call a portfolio θ = (θs)s∈S an asset bundle in 	 :=RS , and denote by Q :=RS+ the space of asset prices q = (qs)s∈S . 
A position θs is a claim if θs ≥ 0 and a liability if θs ≤ 0. We impose bounds on short sales, denoted by bh = (bhs )s∈S where 
bhs ∈ [−∞, 0]. The set of investment strategies is a subset of 	 defined by
	h(bh) := {θ ∈ 	 : θ ≥ bh}.
Agents may not honour their debt obligations at period t = 1. Following Livshits et al. (2007) (see also Eichberger (1989)) 
we assume that default induces the full seizure of endowments and investment returns. That is, upon default, agents receive 
the minimum consumption level (equal to zero), their endowment is sold, and the remaining wealth is handed over to the 
creditors to at least partially redeem their debt. This may prevent agents to default strategically, i.e., if they have the 
resources, they may choose to repay their debt.12 Nevertheless, default can be non-strategic. Since minimally rational agents 
are unable to perfectly foresee equilibrium prices, they can be insolvent at some contingencies.
11 The fact that e j20 > 5e
j1
1 follows from restrictions (i)-(ii). If e
j2
0 ≤ 5e j11 a sequential equilibrium still exists free of these restrictions. Indeed, let q =
e j20 /5e
j1
1 and θ j1 (q) = −5e j11 and θ j2 (q) = 5e j11 . Agent j1 consumes the total endowment of the good at period t = 0 and nothing at period t = 1.
12 A complete description of the bankryptcy rule should also specify the utiltiy penalties upon default. We do not provide details in this direction since 
we will introduce bounds on liabilities that preclude default at equilibrium.
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demand correspondences.13 To overcome this complication we argue for borrowing constraints that preclude default at 
equilibrium.14 Specifically, we assume that
∀h ∈ h, ∀θ ∈ 	h(bh), ∀s ∈ S, ps · ehs + (ps · ξ)θs ≥ 0,
where ps is the prevailing price vector at state s ∈ S . If, for instance, short-selling is forbidden, i.e., bh = 0 for each h ∈ H , 
then default is trivially precluded. Obviously, we argue for borrowing constraints that prevent default but allow for maximal 
risk sharing.15
Given a prevailing price vector ps , the maximum level of debt an agent can issue (subject to no default) at state s ∈ S is 
given by
βhs (ps) = min{θs ∈R : ps · ehs + (ps · ξ)θs ≥ 0}.
Since only relative prices matter, without any loss of generality, we can restrict contingent prices to the simplex 1 of RL1 , 
i.e.,
1 :=
{
ps ∈RL1+ : ps · 1L1 = 1
}
.
We subsequently consider the function βhs from 1 to [−∞, 0] given by
∀πs ∈ 1, βhs (πs) =
⎧⎨⎩ −(πs · e
h
s )/(πs · ξ) if πs · ξ > 0
−∞ if πs · ξ = 0.
We assume that all agents understand that the bounds are imposed according to the family of functions (βhs )s∈S , i.e.,
∀h ∈ H, ∀s ∈ S, bhs = βhs (ps),
where ps ∈ 1 is an equilibrium price vector.
Standard general equilibrium theory assumes a centralised market in which all trades are anonymous and an auctioneer 
orchestrates the equilibration of supply and demand. We may employ a similar reasoning to justify the determination of 
the proposed borrowing constraints. Imagine, for instance, there is a hypothetical clearinghouse that is passive in the sense 
that it does not take an active position itself. Its purpose is to equilibrate supply and demand in financial markets in a 
way that diminishes search and information costs, while reducing default risk by acting as a third party warrantor to every 
contract. From that perspective, the borrowing constraints can be interpreted as an endogenous rule that restricts the trades 
of agents to a set that the clearinghouse foresees no possibility of bankruptcy.
4. Individual optimization
Actions at the initial period t = 0 involve commitments for the future period t = 1. Agents take into account the con-
sequences of their choices, so decision making has to be described retrospectively, that is, by backward induction. Agents 
act rationally in the sense that they use all available information to make decisions. They understand that debt limits con-
vey information about second period prevailing prices. For the sophisticated agents this information is irrelevant. For the 
minimally rational agents this information is useful, but, the dimensionality of the relevant information is, in general, larger 
than the dimensionality of the revealed information.
13 Indeed, if the realized state of nature is s ∈ S , the investment strategy is θs , and the prevailing commodity price is ps , then the budget set contains all 
consumption bundles xs ∈ X1 such that
ps · xs ≤ max{0, ps · ehs + (ps · ξ)θs}.
14 The temporary equilibrium literature recognized long ago the need for institutional restrictions to deal with insolvency and bankruptcy problems. 
Milne (1980) proposes exogenous borrowing constraints that reflect lenders’ perception for default risk. In Stahl (1985) a clearinghouse has subjective 
beliefs about the realization of uncertainty and restricts each individual to a set of portfolios that ensures solvency for all realizations of uncertainty in the 
support of its expectations. A similar idea is behind the credit rationing schemes proposed by Eichberger (1989). A bank that has more pessimistic beliefs 
(relative to agents’ beliefs) imposes a credit rationing scheme that is consistent with its own expectations. Bankruptcy is still possible though its likelihood 
is clearly reduced.
15 In the spirit of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) (see also Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Zhang (1997)), we look for debt limits that are self-enforcing.
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4.1. Actions at period t = 1
At the initial period t = 0, every agent h ∈ H chooses an action a = (x0, θ), where x0 ∈ X0 is a consumption bundle and 
θ ∈ 	h(bh) is a portfolio. At period t = 1, given θ , a realized state of nature s ∈ S and a commodity price vector ps ∈ 1, 
the budget set Bhs (ps, θ) contains all consumption bundles xs ∈ X1 such that
ps · xs ≤ ps · ehs + (ps · ξ)θs.
An agent h ∈ H chooses among consumption bundles xs ∈ Bhs (ps, θ) to maximize her payoff. The demand set is given by
dhs (ps, θ) := argmax
{
uhs (xs) : xs ∈ Bhs (ps, θ)
}
.
What differentiates the minimally rational from the sophisticated agents is how they construct the preference relation at 
the initial period.
4.2. Actions at period t = 0
Given spot prices (p0, q) and debt limits bh , let Bh0(p0, q, b
h) denote agent h’s budget set at period t = 0, containing all 
actions a = (x0, θ) ∈ X0 × 	h(bh) such that
p0 · x0 + q · θ ≤ p0 · eh0.
To choose among actions in this set, agents need to form expectations about future commodity prices.
We assume that agents know that utility functions are strictly increasing, so they infer the trivial non-arbitrage condition 
that any equilibrium price belongs to the set ◦1.16 Given θ ∈ 	h(bh), we denote by vhs (·, θ) the map defined by
∀πs ∈ ◦1, vhs (πs, θ) = sup{uhs (xs) : xs ∈ Bhs (πs, θ)}.
4.2.1. Sophisticated agents
These agents are assumed to have perfect foresight, therefore, they are able to foresee, at period t = 0, which price vector 
ps will prevail at state s ∈ S . Specifically, for every agent i ∈ I , the preference relation over actions in the set X0 × 	i(bi) is 
captured by the function U i0(·; p1) defined by
∀a = (x0, θ), U i0(a; p1) = ui0(x0) +
∑
s∈S
μi(s)vis(ps, θ),
where p1 = (ps)s∈S is the (correctly) anticipated family of contingent prices. Given first-period prices (p0, q), the period-0
demand set is given by
di0(p0,q; p1) := argmax
{
U i0(a; p1) : a ∈ Bi0(p0,q,bi)
}
.
Observe that the demand correspondence does not explicitly depend on the bounds bi = (bis)s∈S . Since the bounds are 
defined by the relation bis = β is(ps) for any s ∈ S , and all sophisticated agents anticipate perfectly the prevailing prices 
(ps)s∈S , observing the bounds does not improve their information set.
4.2.2. Minimally rational agents
These agents cannot perfectly foresee the prevailing commodity prices at period t = 1. Nevertheless, they understand that 
debt limits ensure solvency given period-1 market clearing prices. That is, every agent j ∈ J understands that the bounds 
b j = (b js )s∈S on elementary Arrow securities are imposed according to the family of functions (β js )s∈S . Therefore, observing 
the bound b js at period t = 0, agent j infers a set of possible prices given by


j
s(b
j
s) = {πs ∈ ◦1 : b js = β js (πs)}.
A family of contingent prices π1 = (πs)s∈S belongs to

 j(b j) =
∏
s∈S


j
s(b
j
s).
We notice that minimally rational agents use all available information to forecast future prices. However, as opposed to 
sophisticated agents, they do not perfectly foresee the function that relates the states of nature to exact equilibrium prices. 
They instead know the map from prices to bounds that preclude bankruptcy.
16 Strict increasingness of uhs implies that the set dhs (ps, θ) is well defined if and only if the price ps is strictly positive, i.e., ps ∈ ◦1.
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first-period decisions. A priori, there is no unambiguous mechanism that can be used to assign a probability distribution on 
the set 
 j(b j). Equivalently, decision making is subject to no probabilistic information about possible prevailing prices.
Recent advances in decision theory offer a plethora of alternatives to model ambiguity about exogenous uncertainty.17 For 
our purposes, we adapt well-established decision criteria to capture ambiguity aversion related to endogenous uncertainty. 
To appeal to standard general equilibrium tools, we restrict attention to convex preferences represented by functionals that 
give rise to concave indirect utility functions.18
The first criterion has a variational representation in the spirit of the preferences axiomatised by Maccheroni et al. 
(2006).19 More precisely, given first-period prices (p0, q) and bounds b j , agent j ranks actions a in B
j
0(p0, q, b
j) according 
to V j0(·; b j) defined by
∀a = (x0, θ), V j0(a;b j) = u j0(x0) + inf
{
v j(π1, θ) + c j(π1) : π1 ∈ 
 j(b j)
}
, (†)
where v j(π1, θ) = ∑s∈S μ j(s)v js (πs, θ), and c j : S1 → [0, ∞] is an upper semi-continuous and convex function interpreted 
as the intensity of price ambiguity aversion. Equivalently, c j(π1) represents the cost of selecting the vector of contingent 
prices π1 ∈ 
 j(b j).
If c j(π1) = 0 for all π1 ∈ 
 j(b j) and c j(π1) = ∞ otherwise, then the criterion is simply maxmin expected utility (ex-
treme pessimism). If on the other hand, c j(π̂1) = 0 for some π̂1 ∈ 
 j(b j) and c j(π1) = ∞ otherwise, then the criterion is 
simply expected utility with respect to the price vector π̂1.
The analogue to multiplier preferences (Hansen and Sargent (2008)) obtains when c j(π1) = ∑s∈S c js (πs) and
∀s ∈ S, c js (πs) =
{
κ
j
s R(πs||π̂s), if πs ∈ 
 js(b js)
∞, otherwise,
where R(πs||π̂s) = ∑∈L1 πs() log πs()π̂s() . That is, minimally rational agents have in their mind a benchmark family of con-
tingent prices π̂1 ∈ 
 j(b j), and the cost function is a measure of the distance of other prices in 
 j(b j) with respect to this 
benchmark. The constant κ js > 0 reflects the weight agent j is giving to the possibility that π̂s is not the correct price.
Another specification relates to ε-contamination preferences. In this case, c j(π1) = ∑s∈S c js (πs) and
∀s ∈ S, c js (πs) =
{
0, if πs ∈ (1 − ε)π̂s + ε
 js (b js)
∞, otherwise.
That is, minimally rational agents have in their mind a combination between a price benchmark π̂1 ∈ 
 j(b j) and anything 
else in the set 
 j(b j).
The second criterion has a two-layer expected utility representation in the spirit of the smooth preferences axioma-
tised by Klibanoff et al. (2005). More precisely, given first-period prices (p0, q) and bounds b j , agent j ranks actions a in 
B j0(p0, q, b
j) according to V j0(·; b j) defined by
∀a = (x0, θ), V j0(a;b j) = u j0(x0) +
∫

 j(b j)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|b j), (‡)
where as before v j(π1, θ) = ∑s∈S μ j(s)v js (πs, θ).
Minimally rational agents first evaluate the expected utility of their decision with respect to a family of contingent prices 
π1 ∈ 
 j(b j). Then, instead of taking the infimum over expected utilities, they take an expectation of distorted expected 
utilities according to a probability measure ν j(·|b j). For our purposes the function  j :R →R is assumed to be increasing, 
bounded from above and concave. For instance, an agent j ∈ J may choose a uniform measure over 
 j(b j) and exhibit 
constant ambiguity aversion in the sense that  j(x) = − 1
α j
e−α j x for some α j > 0.
For both criteria, the associated period-0 demand correspondence is given by
d j0(p0,q,b
j) := argmax{V j0(a;b j) : a ∈ B j0(p0,q,b j)}.
17 We refer to Etner et al. (2012) and Gilboa and Marinacci (2013) for comprehensive surveys of the literature.
18 This requirement rules out some interesting criteria, for instance the α-maxmin criterion, that are not in general concave. α-maxmin preferences is a 
special class of biseparable preferences studied in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Ghirardato et al. (2004). The only invariant biseparable preferences 
that are convex are actually maxmin preferences and these are included in our analysis.
19 This class is general enough to nest many models of ambiguity aversion including the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) maxmin preferences, Schmeidler 
(1989) Choquet expected utility, Hansen and Sargent (2008) multiplier preferences, and ε-contamination preferences (see, for instance, Etner et al. (2012)). 
For applications of variational preferences in general equilibrium we refer to Rigotti et al. (2008) and Rigotti and Shannon (2012) who study the market 
implications of ambiguity in the standard Arrow-Debreu model.
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5.1. Informationally constrained equilibrium
We next introduce an equilibrium concept that makes precise the way agents’ decisions become compatible with the 
formation of endogenous, but not necessarily common and degenerate, price expectations.
Definition 5.1. A family {(p0,q, b,a), (ps, xs)s∈S } such that
• p0 is the period-0 consumption price vector
• q is the period-0 asset price vector
• b = (bh)h∈H is the family of period-0 debt limits
• a = (ah)h∈H is the family of period-0 actions
and for each possible state s ∈ S
• ps is the consumption price vector
• xs = (xhs )h∈H is the allocation of consumption bundles
is called an informationally constrained equilibrium (ICE), if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) period-0 actions are optimal, i.e., for every j ∈ J ,
a j ∈ d j0(p0,q,b j) where b j = (b js)s∈S and b js = β js (ps),
and for every i ∈ I ,20
ai ∈ di0(p0,q; p1) where p1 = (ps)s∈S ;
(b) period-0 markets for consumption and assets clear, i.e.,∑
h∈H
xh0 =
∑
h∈H
eh0 and
∑
h∈H
θh = 0;
(c) period-1 actions are optimal, i.e., for every h ∈ H , for every s ∈ S ,
xhs ∈ dhs (ps, θh);
(d) period-1 consumption markets clear, i.e., for every s ∈ S ,∑
h∈H
xhs =
∑
h∈H
ehs .
Theorem 5.1. Under the stated assumptions on primitives (preferences and endowments), an Informationally Constrained Equilibrium 
(ICE) always exists.
The following section presents a sketch of the existence proof and discusses in detail the challenges associated to the 
presence of minimally rational agents. The key insight derives from considering first an auxiliary economy and show that it 
attains a competitive equilibrium similar to Radner (1972) perfect foresight equilibrium. By construction, any selection from 
the set of Radner-like equilibria is indeed an ICE of the original economy. The proofs of the main results are postponed to 
Appendix A. Technical results are presented in Appendix B.
We encompass both representations of ambiguity aversion to price uncertainty discussed in Section 4.2.2. That is, we 
provide a proof assuming that minimally rational agents use either (†) or (‡) to rank first period actions. Establishing upper 
semi-continuity of the optimal demand correspondence is the main technical hurdle under both representations.
Though the proof strategy requires initially the presence of at least one sophisticated agent, this is not essential for our 
existence result. An ICE exists even in settings where all agents are assumed to be minimally rational. We discuss below 
where the presence of a sophisticated agent bits initially and propose an argument to dispense with it.
Finally, we assume that the payoff vector is strictly positive, i.e., ξ ∈RL1++ . This is without any loss of generality since we 
can easily approximate any equilibrium of an economy with positive payoffs by the limit of equilibria of economies with 
strictly positive payoffs.
20 Recall that sophisticated agents face also bounds on short sales, i.e., for all i ∈ I , bis = β is(ps) for any s ∈ S . However, observing the bounds is irrelevant 
for their optimal decisions.
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We denote by P the set of prices p = (p0, q, p1), where p1 = (ps)s∈S is a family of contingent prices with ps ∈ 1 for all 
s ∈ S , and (p0, q) ∈ 0 where
0 :=
{
(p0,q) ∈RL0+ ×RS+ : p0 · 1L0 + q · 1S = 1
}
.
Observe that the set P is non-empty, compact and convex.
Recall that X0 =RL0+ , X1 =RL1+ and 	 =RS . Let (e0, e1) ∈RL0+ ×RL1+ be the aggregate endowments, i.e., e0 :=
∑
h∈H eh0
and e1 := ∑s∈S es with es := ∑h∈H ehs . We fix initially a family of non-empty, compact and convex sets (Xh0 , Xh1, 	h)h∈H
such that, for each t ∈ {0, 1}, the set Xht is a subset of Xt containing the aggregate endowment et in its interior, and 	h is 
a subset of 	 containing 0 in its interior.
We next consider the economy E = (Xh0, Xh1, 	h)h∈H , where the intertemporal budget sets are given by21
Bh(p) =
{
(x0, θ, (xs)s∈S) ∈ Xh0 × 	h × [Xh1]S : (1) and (2)
}
,
where
p0 · x0 + q · θ ≤ p0 · eh0 (1)
and
∀s ∈ S, ps · xs ≤ ps · [ehs + θsξ ]. (2)
The intertemporal demand of a sophisticated agent i ∈ I is given by
δi(p) := argmax
{
ui0(x0) +
∑
s∈S
μi(s)uis(xs) : (x0, θ, (xs)s∈S) ∈ Bi(p)
}
.
The intertemporal demand of a minimally rational agent j ∈ J is given by
δ j(p) := argmax
{
W j0(x0, θ; p1) +
∑
s∈S
μ j(s)u js (xs) : (x0, θ, (xs)s∈S) ∈ B j(p)
}
,
where
W j0(x0, θ; p1) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
u j0(x0) + inf
{
v j(π1, θ) + c j(π1) : π1 ∈ P j(p1)
}
or
u j0(x0) +
∫
P j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1).
The first specification of W j0 applies when actions are ranked according to criterion (†), while the second one applies 
when actions are ranked according to criterion (‡). In both specifications, v j(π1, θ) = ∑s∈S μ j(s)v js (πs, θ) and P j(p1) :=∏
s∈S P
j
s (ps), where for any s ∈ S ,
v js(πs, θ) = sup
{
u js (xs) : xs ∈ X1 and πs · xs ≤ max{0,πs · [e js + θsξ ]}
}
and
P js (ps) := 
 js(β js (ps)) =
{
πs ∈ ◦1 : πs · [e js (ps · ξ) − ξ(ps · e js)] = 0
}
.
The following remark clarifies two important aspects of the function v js .
Remark 5.1. First, the consumption bundles xs are not restricted to lie on the compact set X
j
1. Since minimally rational 
agents discern only a set of possible prevailing prices, they anticipate to consume ex-ante (t = 0) bundles that they will not 
effectively choose to consume ex-post (after the state s is realized and the equilibrium price ps is revealed). So the reason 
to take the supremum over the unbounded set X1.
Second, the budget constraint is written taking the “max” on the right hand side, i.e.,
πs · xs ≤ max{0,πs · [e js + θsξ ]}.
21 To be rigorous we should write Bh(Xh0 , Xh1 , 	h, p). Our choice to omit the sets Xh0, Xh1 , 	h is driven by a desire for notational simplicity.
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price vector πs ∈ P js (ps) such that πs · [e js + θsξ ] < 0. This means that v js may not be concave in θs . Nevertheless, when 
(x0, θ, (xs)s∈S ) ∈ B j(p), the budget restriction (2) implies that
∀s ∈ S, θs ≥ β js (ps) = − ps · e
j
s
ps · ξ .
Since by definition
P js (ps) =
{
πs ∈ ◦1 : β js (ps) = −
πs · e js
πs · ξ
}
,
it follows that πs · [e js + θsξ ] ≥ 0 for all πs ∈ P js (ps). Therefore, v js is indeed concave on budget feasible investment strate-
gies.22
The next remark discusses the restrictions imposed to the family of probability measures in the second specification of 
W j0.
Remark 5.2. We assume that ν j(·|p1) is an absolutely continuous probability measure on S1 with full support on the set 
P j(p1). That is, ν j assigns zero probability to the difference S1\P j(p1) and ν j(π1|p1) = h j(π1|p1)m(π1), where h j is the 
density of ν j and m is the Lebesgue measure on the affine space G defined by
G :=
{
(πs)s∈S ∈RL1×S : ∀s ∈ S, πs · 1L1 = 1
}
.
In addition, the map (π1, p1) → h j(π1|p1) is jointly continuous on P̃ j(p1) × [◦1]S .23
A competitive equilibrium of the economy E = (Xh0, Xh1, 	h)h∈H is a family {(p0,q,a), (ps, xs)s∈S } such that p =
(p0, q, (ps)s∈S ) ∈ P and
∀h ∈ H, (ah, (xhs )s∈S) ∈ δh(p)
together with∑
h∈H
((xh0, θ
h), (xhs )s∈S) =
∑
h∈H
((eh0,0), (e
h
s )s∈S).
Proposition 5.1. Under the assumptions imposed on primitives (preferences and endowments), the economy E = (Xh0, Xh1, 	h)h∈H
attains a competitive equilibrium.
The detailed proof of Proposition 5.1 is presented in Appendix A. The following remark discusses the main challenges.
Remark 5.3. The key step amounts to show that every demand correspondence δh is upper semi-continuous. Indeed, stan-
dard arguments imply that δi (the demand of sophisticated agents) is upper semi-continuous on P. This follows from Berge’s 
Maximum Theorem as the map
(x0, (xs)s∈S) → ui0(x0) +
∑
s∈S
μi(s)uis(xs)
is continuous on Xi0 × [Xi1]S , and the correspondence Bi is non-empty, continuous and compact-valued on P. However, for 
the minimally rational agents, we only succeeded to prove a weaker result.
Lemma 5.1. For any agent j ∈ J , the demand correspondence δ j is upper semi-continuous on 0 × [◦1]S .
22 The concavity of v js with respect to θs implies that W j0 is concave in θ , and that δ j is a convex-valued correspondence. The later property is essential 
for an application of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to prove existence of an equilibrium in economy E .
23 P̃ j(p1) stands for the closure of P j(p1). See Appendix A.
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j
0 ×	 j ×[◦1]S . For the first specification 
of W j0, it is sufficient that the map
(p1, θ) → inf
{
v j(π1, θ) + c j(π1) : π1 ∈ P j(p1)
}
is continuous on [◦1]S × 	 j . Proving continuity with respect to p1 is challenging since the set P j(p1) is not compact, 
preventing the application of the standard Maximum Theorem. Claim A.1 in Appendix A shows how to overcome this 
issue by exploiting recent advances of the Maximum Theorem to problems with non-compact image sets. For the second 
specification of W j0 , it suffices to show that the map
(p1, θ) →
∫
P j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1)
is continuous on [◦1]S ×	 j . Claim A.2 in Appendix A provides a constructive argument that can be of independent interest.
The proof of Proposition 5.1 assumes initially the presence of at least one sophisticated agent, i.e., the set I is non-empty. 
This permits to show that fixed-point prices are strictly positive, a property that is subsequently used to argue that these 
prices clear markets. However, as we argue in the second part of the proof, this assumption is not essential. An ICE exists 
even when the economy is solely composed of minimally rational agents. The key insight rests on considering a sequence 
of artificial economies, each one having a sophisticated agent whose endowments are chosen to converge to zero along the 
sequence. Each artificial economy has an ICE with strictly positive equilibrium prices. Most importantly, the sequence of 
second period commodity prices is uniformly bounded away from zero. Extracting a subsequence if necessary, we show that 
the limit is indeed an equilibrium of the original economy where all agents are minimally rational.
Equipped with Proposition 5.1, we next look the frictionless economy E f which is nothing other than the economy E
when, for every agent h ∈ H , the family of consumption and investment sets (Xh0 , Xh1, 	h) is replaced by the initial one 
(X0, X1, 	). The relevant observation for our purposes is that we can always find a family (Xh0 , X
h
1, 	
h)h∈H of non-empty, 
compact and convex sets such that an equilibrium of the economy E is an equilibrium of the frictionless economy E f .
Indeed, for every agent h ∈ H , let
Xh0 := {x0 ∈ X0 : x0 ≤ e0 + 1L0} and Xh1 := {x1 ∈ X1 : x1 ≤ e1 + 1L1}.
The choice of 	h is more subtle. Let 	̃h be the subset of 	 given by
	̃h := {θ ∈ 	 : ∀s ∈ S, ∃ps ∈ 1 such that ps · [ehs + ξθs] ≥ 0}.
This set is bounded from below. Indeed, let γ := min{ps · ξ : ps ∈ 1}. Since ps · ξ > 0, it follows that γ > 0.24 It is also true 
that ps · ehs ≤ ehs :=
∑
∈L1 e
h
s (). It follows that
θ ∈ 	̃h ⇒ ∀s ∈ S, θs ≥ −max
s∈S θ
h
s ,
where θhs := ehs /γ .
Observe that the set 	̃h is not necessarily convex. Nevertheless, we can work with its convex hull co(	̃h) and define the 
set
	̂ :=
{
(θh)h∈H ∈
∏
h∈H
co(	̃h) :
∑
h∈H
θh = 0
}
.
This set is closed and convex. This is also true for the projection of 	̂ on co(	̃h), denoted 	̂h . We can choose a real number 
r such that 	̂h ⊂ B(0, r).25 It follows that the set 	h := co(	̃h) ∩ B(0, r) is non-empty, compact, convex and contains 0 in 
its interior.
A standard convexity argument (see Appendix A) allows us to prove the following claim.
Proposition 5.2. Given a family of sets (Xh0, X
h
1, 	
h)h∈H specified as above, any equilibrium of the bounded economy E is an equilib-
rium of the frictionless economy E f .
Theorem 5.1 is then a direct corollary of the last proposition since, by construction, any equilibrium of the frictionless 
economy E f is in fact an informationally constrained equilibrium (ICE).
24 Here we exploit the fact that ξ ∈R++ .
25 B(0, r) is the open ball in RS with centre 0 and radius r.
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6. Revelation of information
It is natural to investigate the degree of information revealed at equilibrium. We propose below a complete characterisa-
tion.
Definition 6.1. An informationally constrained equilibrium is said to be:
(a) fully revealing at state s ∈ S , if every agent j ∈ J , after observing the bound b js , can infer the associated equilibrium 
price, i.e.,


j
s(β
j
s (ps)) = {ps};
(b) fully non-revealing at state s ∈ S , if every agent j ∈ J , after observing the bound b js , obtains no information about the 
equilibrium price, i.e.,


j
s(β
j
s (ps)) = ◦1;
(c) partially revealing at state s ∈ S , if it is neither fully revealing nor fully non-revealing.
We introduce the concept of the dimension of a convex set. If A is a convex subset of RL1 , the dimension of A is the 
dimension of the smallest affine space containing A. For instance, the dimension of 1 is |L1| −1. If the set A is a singleton, 
then its dimension is 0.
Proposition 6.1. Let (ps)s∈S be the family of second period prices of an informationally constrained equilibrium. For every agent j ∈ J , 
the information 
 js(b
j
s ) revealed by the bound b
j
s = β js (ps) is a convex subset of ◦1. More precisely, we have


j
s(β
j
s (ps)) =
{
πs ∈ ◦1 : πs ·
[
e js(ps · ξ) − ξ(ps · e js)
]
= 0
}
.
Remark 6.1. If agent j’s endowment is marketable at state s ∈ S , that is, e js ∈ {λξ : λ > 0}, then no information is revealed.
If agent j’s endowment is not marketable at state s ∈ S , that is, e js /∈ {λξ : λ > 0}, then the information set 
 js (β js (ps))
is the intersection of the simplex ◦1 with a hyperplane passing through ps . In particular, it is of dimension |L1| − 2. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the cases for L1 = 2 and L1 = 3. If there are at most two goods at period t = 1, then an informationally 
constrained equilibrium is fully revealing, otherwise, it is only partially revealing.
7. Formation of expectations over time
We can easily extend the model to more than two periods and investigate the formation of price expectations over 
time. For notational simplicity, we undertake this exercise in a simple setting with four periods, i.e., t ∈ T = {0, 1, 2, 3}, no 
exogenous uncertainty, one consumption good per per period and one asset delivering a unit of the consumption good as 
return. Any agent h ∈ H is characterized by a family of instantaneous utility functions uht : [0, ∞) → R and endowments 
eht > 0. Each period t ∈ T , the price of the consumption good is normalized to 1, so the endogenous uncertainty is about 
the future path of asset prices (qt+1, . . . , q3).
At any period t ∈ T , given qt > 0 and bht ≤ 0, agent h ∈ H chooses an action
(xht , θ
h
t ) ∈ [0,∞) × [bht ,∞).
14
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15Subject to no default at any period, the sequence of budget restrictions is given by
∀t ∈ {0,1,2}, xht + qtθht ≤ eht + θht−1
and
xh3 ≤ eh3 + θh2 ,
where by convention q3 = 0 and θh3 = 0. Since we look for bounds that ensure solvency, we consider the family of functions 
(βht )t∈{0,1,2} such that
βh2 = −eh3
∀ρ2 ∈ (0,∞), βh1 (ρ2) = −eh2 + ρ2βh2 = −eh2 − ρ2eh3
and
∀(ρ1,ρ2) ∈ (0,∞)2, βh0 (ρ1,ρ2) = −eh1 + ρ1βh1 (ρ2) = −eh1 − ρ1eh2 − ρ1ρ2eh3.
We assume that minimally rational agents understand that bounds are determined by the family of functions (β jt )t∈{0,1,2} . 
At t = 0, agent j observes the equilibrium price q0 > 0 and the bound b j0 = β j0(q1, q2) where (q1, q2) are the future equilib-
rium prices. The agent needs to form expectations about (q1, q2). Actually, he can infer that the pair (q1, q2) belongs to the 
set


j
0(b
j
0) = {(ρ1,ρ2) ∈ (0,∞)2 : β j0(ρ1,ρ2) = b j0}.
That is, 
 j0(b
j
0) is the following hyperbola


j
0(b
j
0) = {(ρ1,ρ2) ∈ (0,∞)2 : ρ2e j3 = −e j2 − (e j1 + b j0)/ρ1}.
Since b j0 = β j(q1, q2), we must have
b j0 + e j1 = −q1e j2 − q1q2e j3 < 0.
This implies that agent j infers that the equilibrium price q1 belongs to the interval(
0,−b
j
0 + e j1
e j2
)
,
but has no information about the equilibrium price q2.
At period t = 1, agent j observes the equilibrium price q1 together with the bound b j1 = β j1(q2). He infers that the price 
q2 lies in the set


j
1(b
j
1) = {ρ2 > 0 : β j1(ρ2) = b j1} =
{
−b
j
1 + e j2
e j3
}
= {q2}.
That is, the bound at period t = 1 reveals the exact equilibrium price at period t = 2.
We notice that


j
1(b
j
1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information
revealed at t = 1
= 
 j0(b j0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information
revealed at t = 0
⋂
[{q1} × (0,∞)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
signal observed at
t=1
.
Equivalently, the information revealed to minimally rational agents is time consistent.
8. Conclusion
The paper studies an economy in which agents differ in their ability to anticipate future prices. Contrary to temporary 
equilibrium paradigm that takes expectations as part of the primitives of the economy, we explore a channel that allows for 
the endogenous formation of price expectations. Agents make inferences about future prevailing prices by observing bounds 
on short-sales that ensure solvency at any contingency. They know the map from prices to bounds that are compatible with 
no bankruptcy, so, they are capable of inferring a set of prices assuring non-negative wealth the second period. Provided that 
an equilibrium exists, the vector of equilibrium prices will be contained in this set. Though expectations are endogenous, 
they are, in general, neither common nor degenerate.
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realization of future prices. A shortcoming of our approach is that we do not explain how the debt limits are enforced 
at equilibrium.26 We implicitly assume that there is an entity that is able to compute the aggregate demand and solve the 
fixed-point problem to perfectly anticipate market clearing prices. This is clearly not satisfactory. Nevertheless, it is generally 
argued that financial institutions acquire superior information about the state of the economy than individual traders. If 
their objectives assimilate somehow those of the hypothetical entity, the analysis may provide a first approximation of the 
rationale underlying the enforcement of borrowing constraints.
Appendix A. Proofs
This appendix contains the formal proofs of the results presented in Section 5.2. It exploits some technical lemmas 
proven in Appendix B.
For our purposes, given a vector of contingent prices p1 = (ps)s∈S ∈ [◦1]S , we define the correspondence P̃ j(p1) :=∏
s∈S P̃
j
s (ps) where
∀s ∈ S, P̃ js (ps) :=
{
πs ∈ 1 : πs ·
[
e js(ps · ξ) − ξ(ps · e js)
]
= 0
}
.
Notice that P̃ j is non-empty (since p1 ∈ P j(p1) ⊂ P̃ j(p1)), closed and compact-valued. Lemma B.3 shows that it is also 
continuous on [◦1]S .
A.1. Proof of Lemma 5.1
The result follows if we show that W j0 is continuous on X
j
0 × 	 j × [◦1]S . The following claims show that this is true for 
both specifications of W j0 .
Claim A.1. The map
(p1, θ) → inf
{
v j(π1, θ) + c j(π1) : π1 ∈ P j(p1)
}
is continuous on [◦1]S × 	 j .
Proof. Since v j(π1, θ) = +∞ at any π1 = (πs)s∈S with πs ∈ ∂1 for some s ∈ S , taking the infimum over P j(p1) or its 
closure P̃ j(p1) makes no difference. Upper semi-continuity is then a direct consequence of Lemma B.2 and Lemma B.3.
To show that the map is lower semi-continuous is more subtle. The argument exploits an extension of Berge’s Theorem 
to problems with non-compact image sets (see Theorem 1.2 in Feinberg et al. (2013)). More precisely, lower semi-continuity 
follows if we show that v j + c j is K-inf-compact on gph( P̃ j) × 	 j .27
Let λ ∈R and K be a compact set of [◦1]S . By Lemma B.2, v j + c j is continuous on [◦1]S × 	 j , so the set
(λ) :=
{
(π1, θ) ∈ [◦1]S × 	 j : v j(π1, θ) + c j(π1) ≤ λ
}
is a closed subset of [◦1]S × 	 j . The set{
(p1,π1, θ) ∈ K × P̃ j(p1) × 	 j : v j(π1, θ) + c j(π1) ≤ λ
}
is a subset of gphK ( P̃ j) × 	 j . It is also compact since (λ) is closed and P̃ j is compact-valued. This suffices to prove the 
claim. 
26 This is always an issue in sequentially trading economies with borrowing constraints.
27 For a topological space X, we denote by K(X) the family of all nonempty compact subsets of X. For an extended real-valued function f , defined on 
a nonempty subset K of a topological space X, consider the level sets
D f (λ; K ) = {y ∈ K : f (y) ≤ λ} , λ ∈R.
We say that a function f is inf-compact on K if all these sets are compact.
Let  :X → 2Y \ {∅} be a correspondence with its graph on a subset K of X be defined as follows
gphK () =
{
(x, y) ∈ K ×Y : y ∈ (x)} .
A function u :X ×Y →R is called K-inf-compact on gph(), if for every K ∈K(X) this function is inf-compact on gphK ().
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17Claim A.2. The map
(p1, θ) →
∫
P j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1)
is continuous on [◦1]S × 	 j .
Proof. The function  j is assumed to be continuous and bounded from above. It follows that  j ◦ v j is continuous and 
bounded on [◦1]S × 	 j (since v j is continuous and bounded from below), so, without any loss of generality, we can 
assume that  j ◦ v j is positive. Since the measure of the boundary of S1 is zero, taking the integral over P j(p1) or its 
closure P̃ j(p1) makes no difference.
Let B(0, ε) be the closed ball in RL1×S given by
B(0, ε) :=
{
(πs)s∈S ∈RL1×S : ∀s ∈ S, ‖πs‖ ≤ ε and πs · 1L1 = 0
}
.
Given p1 ∈ [◦1]S and P̃ j(p1), we consider the set Bε( P̃ j(p1)) ⊂ G defined by28
Bε( P̃
j(p1)) := P̃ j(p1) + B(0, ε).
Let ε > 0 and (pn1, θ
n)n∈N be a sequence on [◦1]S × 	 j that converges to (p1, θ) ∈ [◦1]S × 	 j .
By Lemma B.4, there exists N such that P̃ j(pn1) ⊂ Bε( P̃ j(p1)) for all n > N . Let An := {π1 ∈ P̃ j(pn1) : π1 /∈ P̃ j(pn1) ∩ P̃ j(p1)}. 
For n large enough, An is a subset of the difference Bε ( P̃ j(p1)) \ P̃ j(p1).
Given an integer N , let Z stand for the closure of ∪n>N P̃ j(pn1). By Lemma B.5, there exists N such that P̃ j(p1) ⊂
Bε( P̃ j(pn1)) ⊂ Bε(Z) ⊂ G for all n > N .29 Let A′n := {π1 ∈ P̃ j(p1) : π1 /∈ P̃ j(pn1) ∩ P̃ j(p1)}. For n large enough, A′n is a subset 
of the difference Bε(Z) \ Z .
Observe that∫
P̃ j(pn1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
ν j(π1|pn1) −
∫
P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1)
=
⎡⎢⎢⎣∫
An
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
ν j(π1|pn1) +
∫
P̃ j(pn1)∩ P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
ν j(π1|pn1)
⎤⎥⎥⎦
−
⎡⎢⎢⎣∫
A′n
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1) +
∫
P̃ j(pn1)∩ P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1)
⎤⎥⎥⎦ .
Since  j ◦ v j is bounded and continuous, the compactness of P̃ j(p1) and the continuity of the density h j implies that, for 
n large enough,30∫
P̃ j(pn1)∩ P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
ν j(π1|pn1) −
∫
P̃ j(pn1)∩ P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1)
≤
∫
P̃ j(p1)
| j(v j(π1, θn)) −  j(v j(π1, θ))|h j(π1|pn1)m(π1)
+
∫
P̃ j(p1)
 j(v j(π1, θ))|h j(π1|pn1) − h j(π1|p1)|m(π1)
≤ B
∫
P̃ j(p1)
| j(v j(π1, θn)) −  j(v j(π1, θ))|m(π1)
28 Recall that G is the affine space spanned by S1 defined in Remark 5.2.
29 Bε (Z) := Z + B(0, ε).
30 The last inequality follows from an application of the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem.
C. Le Van et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 115 (2019) 436–458 45318+B ′
∫
P̃ j(p1)
|h j(π1|pn1) − h j(π1|p1)|m(π1)
≤ ε.
Therefore, for n large enough,∫
P̃ j(pn1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
ν j(π1|pn1) −
∫
P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1)
≤
∫
An
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
ν j(π1|pn1) + ε
≤
∫
Bε ( P̃ j(p1))\ P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
h j(π1|pn1)m(π1) + ε
≤ C
[
m(Bε( P̃
j(p1))) − m( P̃ j(p1))
]
+ ε,
where the last inequality is due to the boundedness of  j ◦ v j , the compactness of Bε( P̃ j(p1)) and the continuity of h j .
We can now claim that the map is upper semi-continuous. Indeed,
lim sup
n
∫
P̃ j(pn1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
ν j(π1|pn1) ≤
∫
P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1)
+C
[
m(Bε( P̃
j(p1))) − m( P̃ j(p1))
]
+ ε,
and the term inside the brackets disappears when ε goes to zero.
A specular argument shows that, for n large enough,∫
P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1) −
∫
P̃ j(pn1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
ν j(π1|pn1)
≤
∫
A′n
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1) + ε
≤
∫
Bε (Z)\Z
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1) + ε
≤ C ′ [m(Bε(Z)) − m(Z)] + ε.
It follows that
lim inf
n
∫
P̃ j(pn1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ
n)
)
ν j(π1|pn1) ≥
∫
P̃ j(p1)
 j
(
v j(π1, θ)
)
ν j(π1|p1)
−C ′ [m(Bε(Z)) − m(Z)] − ε.
This proves that the map is lower semi-continuous as the term inside the brackets disappears when ε goes to zero. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 5.1
For each integer n ∈N , let n1 be the non-empty, compact and convex subset of ◦1 given by
n1 :=
{
ps ∈ 1 : ps ≥ 1|L1|(n + 1)1L1
}
.
We consider the correspondence χ0 : ∏h∈H Xh0 × 	h −→ 20 defined by
χ0((x
h
0, θ
h)h∈H ) := argmax
{∑
p0 · (xh0 − eh0) + q · θh : (p0,q) ∈ 0
}
.
h∈H
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∏
h∈H Xh1 −→ 2
n
1 defined by
χns ((x
h
s )h∈H ) := argmax
{∑
h∈H
ps · (xhs − ehs ) : ps ∈ n1
}
.
Denote by K n the non-empty, compact and convex set
K n = 0 × [n1]S ×
∏
h∈H
Xh0 × 	h × [Xh1]S ,
and let ϕn be the correspondence from K n to K n defined by
ϕn(p, (xh0, θ
h, (xhs )s∈S)h∈H ) = χ0((xh0, θh)h∈H ) ×
∏
s∈S
χns ((x
h
s )h∈H ) ×
∏
h∈H
δh(p).
The correspondence ϕn is upper semi-continuous with non-empty, compact and convex values. Kakutani’s Theorem implies 
that ϕn has a fixed-point {(pn0, qn, an), (pns , xns )s∈S }. Since every set K n is a subset of the compact set
K = 0 × S1 ×
∏
h∈H
Xh0 × 	h × [Xh1]S ,
passing to a subsequence if necessary, {(pn0, qn, an), (pns , xns )s∈S }n∈N converges to an element {(p0, q, a), (ps, xs)s∈S } in K .
Claim A.3. The family {(p0, q, a), (ps, xs)s∈S } is an equilibrium of the economy E = (Xh0, Xh1, 	h)h∈H .
Proof. We consider two cases.
Case 1. Assume that the set of sophisticated agents is non-empty, i.e., I = ∅.
Since the demand correspondence of sophisticated agents is upper semi-continuous on 0 × S1 , we have that
∀i ∈ I, (xi0, θ i, (xis)s∈S) ∈ δi(p0,q, (ps)s∈S).
Summing up the budget constraints at period t = 0 across all agents, and using the fact that (p0, q) ∈ χ0((xh0, θh)h∈H ) we 
obtain that
∀(p′0,q′) ∈ 0, p′0 ·
∑
h∈H
(xh0 − eh0) + q′ ·
∑
h∈H
θh ≤ p0 ·
∑
h∈H
(xh0 − eh0) + q ·
∑
h∈H
θh ≤ 0.
The above implies that∑
h∈H
(xh0 − eh0) ≤ 0 and
∑
h∈H
θh ≤ 0.
In particular, for any sophisticated agent i ∈ I , we have that xi0 ≤ e0, where e0 is the aggregate endowment that lies in the 
interior of Xi0. Since the utility functions are strictly increasing, we infer that p0 ∈RL0++ .
Fix a state s ∈ S . Summing up the budget constraints across all agents, and using the fact that pns ∈ χns ((xhs )h∈H ) we 
obtain that
∀ps ∈ n1,
∑
h∈H
ps · (xh,ns − ehs ) ≤
∑
h∈H
pns · (xh,ns − ehs ) ≤ 0.
Let p′s ∈ ◦1. There exists n0 such that, for any n ≥ n0, we have p′s ∈ n1. Hence,
∀n ≥ n0,
∑
h∈H
p′s · (xh,ns − ehs ) ≤
∑
h∈H
pns · (xh,ns − ehs ) ≤ 0.
Passing to the limit, we get that∑
h∈H
p′s · (xhs − ehs ) ≤
∑
h∈H
ps · (xhs − ehs ) ≤ 0.
Since p′s was arbitrary, the inequality holds for any p′s ∈ ◦1 and, by continuity, for any p′s ∈ 1. Therefore, we get that∑
(xhs − ehs ) ≤ 0.h∈H
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20In particular, for any sophisticated agent i ∈ I , we have that xis ≤ es , where es is the aggregate endowment at state s ∈ S
that lies in the interior of Xi1. Since the utility functions are strictly increasing, we infer that ps ∈RL1++ .
Observe that any security delivers, contingent to a state s ∈ S , the bundle ξ . Since ps is strictly positive, the asset delivers 
the strictly positive value ps · ξ . By non-arbitrage, the price qs at period t = 0 must be strictly positive.
Lemma 5.1 shows that the demand correspondence δ j is upper semi-continuous on 0 × [n1]S . Therefore, as 
(p0, q, (ps)s∈S ) is a family of strictly positive prices, we obtain
∀ j ∈ J , (x j0, θ j, (x js )s∈S) ∈ δ j(p0,q, (ps)s∈S).
To conclude the proof, we show that all markets clear.
As utility functions are strictly increasing, the budget constraints must be binding at the optimal solution. This implies 
that
p0 ·
∑
h∈H
(xh0 − eh0) = 0 and q ·
∑
h∈H
θh = 0,
together with
∀s ∈ S, ps ·
∑
h∈H
(xhs − ehs ) = 0.
Market clearing follows as all prices are strictly positive.
Case 2. Assume that the set of sophisticated agents is empty, i.e., I = ∅.
We consider a sequence of artificial economies, each one populated by the minimally rational agents and a single so-
phisticated agent, indexed by i ∈N . The fundamentals of the artificial agent are as follows: at every s ∈ {0} ∪ S endowments 
equal eis() = α/i, where  ∈ L0 ∪ L1 and α ∈ (0, 1); the utilities (uis)s∈{0}∪S are assumed to be linear with all good coeffi-
cients equal to 1.
Any artificial economy has a competitive equilibrium {(pi0, qi, ai), (pis, xis)s∈S } with all prices (pi0, qi, (pis)s∈S ) be strictly 
positive. We claim that the second period commodity prices are, in fact, uniformly bounded away from zero, with the bound 
be independent of the index i. Indeed, fix s ∈ S and  ∈ L1. From the optimality conditions of the artificial agent i we infer 
that
pis()
pis(k)
≥ 1, for all k ∈ L1 \ {}.
Summing over k ∈ L1 \ {} and exploiting the fact that pis ∈ 1 we obtain that
pis() ≥
1
|L1| .
This proves that pis is uniformly bounded away from zero.
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, {(pi0, qi, ai), (pis, xis)s∈S }i∈N converges to an element {(p0, q, a), (ps, xs)s∈S }. Since 
ps ∈ ◦1, by Lemma 5.1 (the demand correspondence δ j is upper semi-continuous on 0 × [◦1]S ), we get that
∀ j ∈ J , (x j0, θ j, (x js )s∈S) ∈ δ j(p0,q, (ps)s∈S).
Since the utility functions are strictly increasing we can infer that p0 ∈RL0++ and q ∈RS++ .
We claim that the family {(p0, q, a), (ps, xs)s∈S } is an equilibrium of the original economy that is solely populated by 
minimally rational agents. It suffices to show that the optimal consumption and investment decisions of the artificial agent 
converge to zero as i approaches to infinite.
Indeed, for any i ∈N ,
pi0 · (xi0 − ei0) + qi · θ i = 0.
In addition, for all s ∈ S ,
θ is ≥
−∑∈L1 ei()
pis · ξ
= −|L1|(α/i)
pis · ξ
and
pis · (xis − eis) = (pis · ξ)θ is .
Since eis() = α/i for any s ∈ {0} ∪ S and  ∈ L0 ∪ L1, taking the limit as i goes to infinite proves the claim. 
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21A.3. Proof of Proposition 5.2
Assume that {(p0,q,a), (ps, xs)s∈S } is an equilibrium of the bounded economy E . Fix and agent h ∈ H . To prove the 
result it suffices to show that (ah, (xhs )s∈S ) is still the optimal choice in the frictionless economy E f .
Assume on the contrary that there exists another allocation (ah′, (xh′s )s∈S ) ∈ X0 × 	 × [X1]S that is budget feasible and 
gives agent h higher utility. It is then easy to find λ ∈ (0, 1] such that the allocation
(āh, (x̄hs )s∈S) = λ(ah, (xhs )s∈S) + (1 − λ)(ah′, (xh′s )s∈S)
is still budget feasible and lies on the set Xh0 ×	h ×[Xh1]S . As utility functions are assumed to be concave, we conclude that 
(āh, (x̄hs )s∈S ) is strictly preferable to (ah, (xhs )s∈S ). This contradicts the optimality of (ah, (xhs )s∈S ) in the bounded economy E .
Appendix B. Preliminary results
We here state some technical results that are used in the main proofs. To this purpose, for any integer n ∈ N , let n1 be 
a non-empty, compact and convex subset of ◦1 given by
n1 :=
{
π ∈ 1 : π ≥ 1|L1|(n + 1)1L1
}
.
Lemma B.1. Fix s ∈ S. For any n ∈N , the correspondence
B js : 1 × 	 j → 2X1
defined by
B js(πs, θ) =
{
xs ∈ X1 : πs · xs ≤ max{0,πs · [e js + θsξ ]}
}
is continuous on n1 × 	 j with non-empty, compact and convex values.
Proof. Notice that there exists a compact set X j,n1 of X1 such that
∀(πs, θ) ∈ n1 × 	 j, B js(πs, θ) ⊂ X j,n1 .
It is also true that the set
gph(B js) ∩
[
n1 × 	 j × X j,n1
]
is closed. Let B j,ns : n1 × 	 j → 2X
j,n
1 be the correspondence defined by
B j,ns (πs, θ) = B js(πs, θ).
The Closed Graph Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 17.11) applies to B j,ns , so the correspondence B
j
s is upper 
semi-continuous on n1 × 	 j .
The proof of lower semi-continuity deserves more attention. If πs · [e js + θsξ ] > 0, it is easy to show that B js is lower 
semi-continuous at (πs, θ). Assume next that πs · [e js + θsξ ] ≤ 0, and choose a sequence (πks , θk)k∈N converging to (πs, θ). 
Fix xs in B
j
s (πs, θ). Since πs belongs to n1, we must have xs = 0. Choose now the sequence (xks )k∈N defined by xks = 0 for 
each k. It is obvious that (xks )k∈N converges to xs and, for each k, we have xks ∈ B js (πks , θk). This proves the claim. 
Lemma B.2. The map (π1, θ) → v j(π1, θ) + c j(π1) is upper semi-continuous on [1]S × 	 j and continuous on [◦1]S × 	 j .
Proof. Observe that v js (πs, θ) = +∞ when πs ∈ ∂1.31 Let (πns , θn)n∈N be a sequence on 1 ×	 j that converges to (πs, θ), 
where πs ∈ ∂1. It follows that
lim sup
n
v js(π
n
s , θ
n) ≤ v js(πs, θ) = +∞.
Fix an integer n ∈N . Given Claim B.1, continuity of v js on n1 × 	 j follows from the Maximum Theorem. Since this is true 
for any n ∈N , we get that v js is continuous on ◦1 × 	 j .
The claim is true as v j is the weighted sum of (v js )s∈S , and by assumption c j is upper semi-continuous and convex. 
31 Indeed, if πs() = 0 for some good  ∈ L1, then the demand for that good is infinite, i.e., xs() = +∞, and u js (xs) = +∞.
C. Le Van et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 115 (2019) 436–458 45722Lemma B.3. The correspondence P̃ j is continuous on [◦1]S .
Proof. Fix s ∈ S . The correspondence P̃ js is non-empty, compact-valued and closed. Therefore, it is upper semi-continuous 
by an application of the Closed Graph Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 17.11). Upper semi-continuity of P̃ j
follows from the fact that it is the product of compact-valued upper semi-continuous correspondences.
It is also true that the product of lower semi-continuous correspondences is lower semi-continuous. However, proving 
that P̃ js is lower semi-continuous is slightly more involved.
Let (pns )n∈N be a sequence in ◦1 that converges to some ps ∈ ◦1. Fix πs ∈ P̃ js (ps). If e js = λξ for some λ > 0, then 
P̃ js (ps) = 1 and the claim is trivially true. We impose e js = λξ for any λ > 0 and consider three cases:
(i) Suppose, passing to a subsequence if necessary, that πs ·
[
e js (p
n
s · ξ) − ξ(pns · e js )
]
= 0 for all n ∈N . In this case, simply 
set πns = πs for all n ∈N .
(ii) Suppose, passing to a subsequence if necessary, that πs ·
[
e js (p
n
s · ξ) − ξ(pns · e js )
]
> 0 for all n ∈ N . We claim that 
there exists π ′s ∈ ◦1 such that
π ′s ·
[
e js(ps · ξ) − ξ(ps · e js)
]
< 0. (*)
Indeed, if this is not true, then, for all π ′s ∈ ◦1,
π ′s ·
[
e js(ps · ξ) − ξ(ps · e js)
]
≥ 0.
By continuity, the inequality is true for all π ′s ∈ 1. Define next
∀ ∈ L1, γ(ps) := e js()(ps · ξ) − ξ()(ps · e js).
Observe that γ(ps) ≥ 0. Since ps ∈ ◦1 ∩ P̃ j(ps), we have that 
∑
∈L1 ps()γ(ps) = 0. It follows that γ(ps) = 0 for any 
 ∈ L1. This in turn implies that e js () = ps ·e
j
s
ps ·ξ ξ(), contradicting the fact that e
j
s = λξ for any λ > 0.
Due to inequality (∗), for n large enough, we have that π ′s ·
[
e js (p
n
s · ξ) − ξ(pns · e js )
]
< 0. Let λn ∈ (0, 1) be as follows
λn :=
∑
∈L1 π
′
s()γ(p
n
s )∑
∈L1 π
′
s()γ(p
n
s ) −
∑
∈L1 πs()γ(p
n
s )
,
and observe that
λn
∑
∈L1
πs()γ(p
n
s ) + (1 − λn)
∑
∈L1
π ′s()γ(pns ) = 0.
Define next πns = λnπs + (1 − λn)π ′s . By construction, for n large enough, πns ∈ 1 and πns ·
[
e js (p
n
s · ξ) − ξ(pns · e js )
]
= 0. That 
is, πns ∈ P̃ js (pns ). Letting n → ∞, we get that λn → 1 and πns → πs .
(iii) The case where πs ·
[
e js (p
n
s · ξ) − ξ(pns · e js )
]
< 0, for all n ∈N , unravels in a similar manner, therefore, the argument 
is omitted. 
We next exhibit two additional properties of the correspondence P̃ j . The first one follows from the fact that P̃ j is upper 
semi-continuous with convex and compact values.
Lemma B.4. Let (pn1)n∈N be a sequence in [◦1]S that converges to p1 ∈ [◦1]S . Then, for any ε > 0, there exists an integer N, such 
that, for any n > N, P̃ j(pn1) ⊂ P̃ j(p1) + B(0, ε), where B(0, ε) is a closed ball in RL1×S centered at 0 with radius ε .
The second property is less obvious so it requires a proof.32
Lemma B.5. Let (pn1)n∈N be a sequence in [◦1]S that converges to p1 ∈ [◦1]S . Then, for any ε > 0, there exists an integer N, such 
that, for any n > N, P̃ j(p1) ⊂ P̃ j(pn1) + B(0, ε), where B(0, ε) is a closed ball in RL1×S centered at 0 with radius ε . Equivalently, for 
any ε > 0, there exists N, such that,
∀n > N, ∀π1 ∈ P̃ j(p1), ∃πn1 ∈ P̃ j(pn1) ∩ B(π1, ε).
32 We are not aware of any general result that implies this property.
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23Proof. Assume that the statement is not true. Then, there exists ε > 0, such that, given N , there exists n(N) > N and 
π1(N) ∈ P̃ j(p1) such that
∀π1 ∈ P̃ j(pn(N)1 ), ‖π1 − π1(N)‖ > ε.
Since the set P̃ j(p1) is compact, we can assume that π1(N) → π̄1 ∈ P̃ j(p1) as N → ∞. That is, there exists M such that 
‖π̄1 − π1(N)‖ < ε/2 for all N > M .
Hence,
∀N > M, ∀π1 ∈ P̃ j(pn(N)1 ), ‖π1 − π̄1‖ ≥ ‖π1 − π1(N)‖ − ‖π̄1 − π1(N)‖ ≥ ε/2.
This delivers a contradiction. Indeed, since P̃ j is lower semi-continuous, there exists a sequence {πn(N)1 }N∈N such that 
π
n(N)
1 ∈ P̃ j(pn(N)1 ) for all N , and πn(N)1 → π̄1 as N → ∞. 
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